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1. Introduction 
According to the EU Commission, the Single Euro Payments Area (SEPA) should make a 
significant contribution to making Europe the most competitive and dynamic knowledge-driven 
economy by 2010. SEPA should change the European payments business fundamentally. ‘Best 
of breed’ payment products should replace less efficient ones. Services such as e-invoicing 
should allow cost reductions in the payment processes of bank customers and should offer 
banks additional sources of revenue. The additional sources of revenue are supposed to 
compensate for the expected price erosion of ‘traditional’ payment services, due to increased 
competition among service providers. All national payments standards are supposed to 
disappear and be replaced by new SEPA standards, which should allow additional economies of 
scale and scope.  
The European banking industry declared that it will create SEPA in a market-driven and self-
regulated process. In June 2002, the EPC (European Payments Council) was established as the 
decision-making and coordination body of the European banking industry in relation to 
payments. The EPC developed new payments standards for SEPA.  
One task of the EPC is to convince market participants to switch from ‘old’ national standards 
to the ‘new’ European standards. In order to achieve the migration from the national standards 
to the new standards in a market-driven process, it is necessary to prove that the new standards 
will bring significant economic advantages. In a network industry, cost reductions and/or 
additional revenues that can be realised by applying the new standards have to exceed the 
network effects currently realised with the old standard. Low introductory pricing, a common 
technique in switching to a network market, would cannibalise the revenue streams of services 
based on the ‘old’ national standards.  
After six years of intensive work on developing SEPA, and roughly 18 months before SEPA 
was due to have been completed (end of 2010) it must be concluded that the SEPA process is in 
a crisis. The banks and their customers are rather reluctant to migrate to the new SEPA 
standards. Some of the banks and banking associations contributing to the work of the EPC can 
only partially identify the benefits the European Commission has attributed to SEPA.  
In order to succeed in a self-regulated process, incentives are necessary to motivate service 
providers and users to change their current behaviour and to migrate to new service standards. 
There has to be a compelling business argument for service providers and service users to 
develop, to introduce and to apply ‘best of breed’ payment products.  
However, with the business models currently applied by the majority of European banks, only a 
fraction of the expected benefits can be realised. In order to reap a larger share of SEPA’s 
benefits, banks would have to convert their currently applied payment strategies – mainly 
focused on domestic optimisation – to a true SEPA strategy.  
The ‘old’ alliance of banks might currently not have the strength to change the nationally-
oriented payment markets into a SEPA market. The formation of new alliances of banks (with a 2 | JÜRGEN BOTT 
clear commitment to SEPA) and non-banks (with opportunities to integrate payment services 
into their value chain) might be required before the national payments market can be induced to 
migrate to the new SEPA market. Unless these new alliances are established, EU regulators will 
have to continue to spur on the realisation of SEPA as they did the EC Regulation 2560/2001 on 
cross-border payments in euro, which eliminated the differences in price between cross-border 
and national payments, and clarify ‘multilateral interchange fees’ (MIF). It might also be 
necessary to set end-dates for the use of the ‘old’ national standards.  
2. European  Commission:  Better prices and services needed 
The realisation of SEPA is a logical consequence of the promises of the euro. No that the euro 
has been introduced, it is indispensable to also harmonise the operations of non-cash 
transactions. The vision is to remove all technical, legal and commercial barriers between the 
domestic payments markets in Europe. SEPA is seen to be part of the Lisbon Agenda, which 
aims to make Europe the most competitive and dynamic knowledge-driven economy by 2010. 
Costs for providing and using payment services are supposed to be reduced significantly. The 
latest technologies should be used to deliver modern means of payment to European citizens 
and companies.  
2.1  Strong commitment of the European Commission and the European Central 
Bank 
European Commissioner Charlie McCreevy considers payments the lifeblood of a modern 
economy. Without an efficient payments system it is not possible to build an efficient and 
properly functioning economy.  
Today the European payments business is rather fragmented. European countries have historical 
reasons for using various payments instruments. Customer behaviour, the competitive 
environment and legal regulations of the payment business differ among the European 
countries. Therefore, the business models, technical models and operational models differ, too. 
Each country has optimised its domestic payment infrastructure in accordance with its specific 
conditions and requirements, resulting in a heterogeneous use of payment instruments, data 
formats, encryption standards and interbank arrangements (for example how to handle 
reversals).  
In Europe, the business models of the retail payment industry are mainly oriented towards their 
heterogeneous national payment requirements. In the major European countries, roughly 95% of 
the retail payment transactions are purely domestic. Only 3% of the transactions are cross-
border within the Single Euro Payments Area (SEPA). The rest belongs to cross-border 
transactions with countries outside SEPA.
1  
SEPA aims at enabling retail payments in euro to be made throughout the euro area under the 
same basic conditions from a single account, regardless of its location.
2 Within SEPA, there will 
be no distinction between domestic and cross-border payments in euro anymore. Consumers 
will be able to make euro payments throughout Europe from one single bank account using a 
single set of payment instruments as simply and securely as they currently make domestic 
payments. Business enterprises will also benefit from the uniform handling of payments in euro 
                                                      
1 Although percentages differ by banks, countries and statistical basis, the underlying message is 
consistent. Domestic payment transactions are far more numerous than cross-border transactions within 
SEPA.  
2 European Central Bank, Eurosystem, Single Euro Payments Area (SEPA) from concept to reality, Fifth 
Progress Report, July 2007, p. 4. THE SINGLE EURO PAYMENTS AREA | 3 
and will no longer have to hold accounts in several countries in order to remit and receive such 
payments.
3 
The objective of SEPA is not only to resolve the issue of cross-border payments, but also to 
harmonise the payments business in all of the domestic markets and to make the cross-border 
transactions between the national markets of SEPA equal to the domestic transactions. To only 
improve cross-border transactions between SEPA countries is not considered to be acceptable. 
The realisation of the SEPA, as intended by the European Commission and the Eurosystem 
(European System of Central banks; ESCB), requires – in its final consequence – that national 
infrastructures disappear. In all countries belonging to SEPA, a new Europe-wide harmonised 
infrastructure will replace the current national infrastructure. National markets within SEPA will 
merge into a new market. 
SEPA will increase the competitiveness of European business and the financial sector, as well 
as bring about the integration of payment markets in the EU, which was identified in 2000 as 
one of the key measures to improve Europe’s competitiveness, growth and employment under 
the Lisbon Agenda.
4  
The European Central Bank (ECB) and the members of the ESCB consider SEPA to be a major 
European objective.
5 According to Jean-Michel Godeffroy, Director General, Payment Systems 
and Market Infrastructure of the ECB, it is a prerequisite to allow Europe to become as efficient 
as the United States and to see national payment systems become discontinued or merged to 
form one bigger, more efficient system.
6  
According to the ECB, the major benefits of SEPA will materialise only if the project is future-
oriented. SEPA should not be restricted to the translation of existing national procedures, 
infrastructures and standards into European ones. European actors should rethink what they 
have taken for granted so far. They should pay due attention to the new possibilities offered by 
progress in information technology. Innovative solutions have to be found to meet the 
technological challenges in the European payment landscape.
7 
SEPA could be re-enforced by legislation or by the direct participation of the Eurosystem. The 
disadvantage of the mandatory approach is that the legislature may decide on inferior standards. 
Already in November 2005, Mrs. Tumpel-Gugerell (Member of the Executive Board of the 
ECB) declared that the Eurosystem prefers to leave the processing of retail payments to the 
banking industry itself. She sees only two scenarios in which the national central banks may 
consider taking a more active role:  
1.  the banking industry fails to deliver the requested infrastructure for SEPA; or  
2.  the banking industry delivers only basic services that have to be complemented by the 
individual players.
8 
                                                      
3 Elin Amundsen, “SEPA – Single Euro Payments Area”, in Danmarks Nationalbank, Monetary Review, 
1st Quarter 2007, p. 105. 
4 Charlie McCreevy, “Making the best of SEPA”, National Payments Conference 2008, Dublin, 18 May 
2008 (http://www.europa-nu.nl/9353000/1/j9vvh6nf08temv0/vhu6jimyfryn?ctx=vhbildwc2kc9). 
5 European Central Bank, “Towards a Single Euro Payments Area, objectives and deadlines”, Fourth 
Progress Report, February 2006, p. 4.  
6 Jean-Michel Godeffroy, “SEPA for cards – a great opportunity for Europe”, ZKA (Central Credit 
Committee) information session, Berlin, 15 January 2008.  
7 European Central Bank, Fourth Progress Report, op. cit., p. 8. 
8 Gertrude Tumpel-Gugerell, “SEPA: Making the dream become a reality”, speech held on 15 November 
2005, EU/US Retail Banking Forum, Brussels. 4 | JÜRGEN BOTT 
The ECB and the Eurosystem play the role of facilitator. The process of realising SEPA is 
conveyed in progress reports and the speeches of ECB representatives and representatives of 
National Central Banks of the Eurosystem. Furthermore, the ECB acts as mediator between the 
diverse interests of the different stakeholders in the SEPA process. 
2.2  Expectations of policy-makers: Impressive gains 
The European Commission expects that SEPA will result in tremendous gains and potential 
savings for the general public and that it will bring benefits to all stakeholders. In a consultation 
paper on SEPA incentives, the European Commission (Directorate-General for Internal Market 
& Service) monetises the related financial benefits at about €122 billion per year.
9 The biggest 
part of the expected benefits (some €100 billion) stem from new services such as e-invoicing. 
Increased use of electronic payments will benefit Europe by €5.3 billion. Product 
standardisation and infrastructure consolidation are expected to contribute €10 billion and fees 
unification will contribute €6.7 billion. 
Accordingly, the potential the EU Commission has identified as stemming from scale and scope 
economies – combined with effective competition – add up to €22 billion. Much more 
substantial are the gains that will arise if SEPA is used as a catalyst to launch the next 
generation of e-payments, for example e-invoicing. According to the European Commission’s 
report of 2006, a conservative estimate of the saving potential of e-invoicing easily exceeds 
€100 billion every year.  
The Commission bases its calculations on studies performed by the European Association of 
Corporate Treasurers (EACT) and the experiences in some member states (especially from the 
Nordic and Baltic countries). EACT estimates that the volume of European invoices exceeds 
€27 billion per year. More than 50% of the invoices are exchanged between enterprises 
(business to business) or between enterprises and governments (business to government). EACT 
calculates the current costs of manually processing an invoice at €30 to €80 per invoice and the 
cost-saving from electronic processing between 60-90%. In an electronic system there is no 
need to re-key in details of the transactions for example; they only need to be approved. Order 
and invoice reconciliation could be automated and bookkeeping and accounting records 
electronically updated.  
The productivity gains are available from straight-through-processing (STP). Customers access 
banks’ payment services through a variety of gateways. Payment processes are strongly linked 
to other applications of the banks and bank customers’ IT environments. Smoothing 
interruptions at each of these many interfaces, especially avoiding manual interference, 
contributes to error and cost reductions.  
Automation also results in better cash flow and lower risk as senders can invoice more 
frequently without causing costs to their customers. EACT estimates a saving potential of €243 
billion per year. The Commission assumes that only portions of the transactions can be 
processed as e-invoices and calculates more moderate savings per invoice. On the basis of a 
more conservative approach than that of EACT, the Commission estimates cost savings of €100 
billion per year.
10  
More recently published studies estimate a much lower – but still impressive – market potential 
of realising SEPA. In a study published in 2007, Capgemini sees a market potential of up to 
                                                      
9 European Commission, Internal Market and Services DG, Consultative paper on SEPA incentives, 13 
February 2006, Brussels, p. 41f.  
10 Ibid., p. 42. THE SINGLE EURO PAYMENTS AREA | 5 
€123 billion – cumulative over six years.
11 E-invoicing would bring an additional net effect of 
€238 billion (cumulative over six years).
12  
Most European banks do not participate in the e-invoicing business yet. However, Capgemini 
sees banks well-positioned to offer services in the e-invoicing market, creating a potential extra 
revenue flow to banks of up to €3.4 billion per year. Even bigger benefits are expected on the 
demand side (from bank customers) with potential cost savings of up to 0.8% of the GDP of 
most European countries per year on invoice-related processes.
13  
 
Figure 1. Estimated benefits of SEPA 
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Source: European Commission, Internal Market. 
 
The momentum to improve Europe’s payment landscape opens a window of opportunity for a 
technological and procedural leap. This opportunity should be used for visionary solutions. 
Service providers should look beyond the borders of the traditional payment services sector.
14  
2.3  European banks’ promise to create SEPA  
The European banks intend to create SEPA in a self-regulated process, driven by market forces. 
In 2002, the European banking industry declared in a White Paper
15 its intention to create SEPA 
                                                      
11 Capgemini Consulting, “SEPA: potential benefits as stake, Researching the impact of SEPA on the 
payments market and its stakeholders”, Utrecht, 2007, p. 4.  
12 Ibid., p. 29. 
13 Ibid., p. 5. 
14 European Commission, Internal Market and Services DG, Consultative paper on SEPA incentives, 
Brussels, 13 February 2006, p. 20. 6 | JÜRGEN BOTT 
by 2010. They founded the European Payments Council (EPC). Members of the EPC are 
European banks and banking associations from Europe. The EPC has so far focused on 
establishing new rules & regulations, creating new standards for processing payments in SEPA. 
They published ‘rule books’ for a SEPA Credit Transfer (SCT), a SEPA Direct Debit (SDD) 
and a framework for card transactions in SEPA (SEPA Card Framework; SCF). The EPC has 
decided that payment messages in SEPA must be based on international standards (UNIFI, ISO 
20022; Extensible Markup Language, XML).  
In the early years especially, the SEPA project only made limited progress. On several 
occasions, the ECB and the Commission expressed concern about the project. In its third 
progress report the ECB wrote: “The Eurosystem is concerned that the EPC has been 
significantly delayed in implementing its objective”.
16 
Although the ECB and the Commission emphasised that they could take on a more active role, 
if the process was not speeded up, it would be left to the banking community to deliver SEPA as 
promised in a self-regulated process, driven by market forces. A self-regulated process driven 
by market forces requires an environment where market forces can work, where competitive 
forces achieve convergence, and where innovations are honoured.  
However, operational bankers do not have a reputation for extensive innovative powers. Banks 
are creative in developing new financial products and derivative financial products. However, 
when it comes to innovations in operational services, banks are quite ‘unobtrusive’, despite 
customer demands for improved operational processes. In her opening speech at the SIBOS 
S.W.I.F.T. conference in Atlanta in October 2004, Heidi Miller (Treasury & Securities Services 
Executive, JPMorgan Chase & Co) remarked:  
Customers tell us they need to achieve substantial improvements in their own 
efficiency and productivity. They want us to help them re-engineer their supply chains, 
speed their order-to-pay cycles, free working capital, and integrate seamlessly with 
their internal transaction and information systems. They want it in real time, across all 
borders. And of course, they want more value at lower cost.“[…]”customers cannot 
understand why an overnight delivery service can tell them exactly where a package is 
from the second it leaves their premises to the moment it arrives at its destination, but 
banks can not tell them exactly where a cross-border payment is as it moves through 
the process.
17  
European banks and banking associations have concentrated on the development of new 
standards for ‘traditional’ service offers. At the end of 2008 no path-breaking products had been 
announced on the basis of the work of the EPC, which started in 2002.  
Customers expect more value from SEPA and not just new standards. The new standards have 
to be transformed into new service offers, which make payments faster, more secure or increase 
user-interface efficiency and make the interface between banks and their customers more user-
friendly.  
The Commission and the ECB have said on several occasions that SEPA products must not be 
developed to the lowest denominator of existing national service levels. Mrs. Tumpel-Gugerell 
                                                                                                                                                            
15 European Payments Council, “Euroland: Our Single Payments Area”, see the EPC website 
(www.europeanpaymentscouncil.eu) under “EPC Documents”. 
16 European Central Bank, “Towards a Single Euro Payments Area”, Third Progress Report, December 
2004, p. 9.  
17 Heidi Miller, Keynote speech, Opening plenary SIBOS 2004 
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remarked in 2005 that the aim must be to replace existing national schemes with a future-
oriented scheme that is at least as efficient as the best national schemes to date; a scheme based 
on common standards that could also be used as a platform for services that the euro area will 
have in the future.
18  
In early 2006, the European Commission identified gaps between its interpretation of SEPA and 
the work in the EPC, which was set up to drive the self-regulatory process towards SEPA.
19 
Examples are: 
o  The self-regulatory process cannot be considered successful if it does not include effective 
consultation of all stakeholders. 
o  Governance of the self-regulatory process cannot be in the hands of an exclusive club – 
non-banks need to be involved. 
According to the Commission, the requests from enterprises and private consumers for new and 
better payment services should be implemented more effectively in the work of the EPC. A self-
regulatory process should not be exclusively led by banks.  
European banks introduced the new standard for credit transfers SCT on 28 January 2008. The 
first benefits of SEPA have since materialised. In September 2008, seven million SCT 
transactions were processed, accounting for 1.5% of the total credit transfer volume.
20  
Regarding the service level currently offered to customers, the SCT does not improve on the 
existing national service levels. However, SCT is a standardised payment scheme across borders 
and it is XML-based. This might support the further standardisation of banks’ customer 
interface and it might ease the inclusion of additional data into the payment message and 
facilitate end-to-end automation and automated reconciliation.  
The new standard for direct debits SDD is scheduled to start on 1 November 2009 with basic 
functionality. At the end of the year 2008, however, there were still many uncertainties, which 
may prevent a timely and successful launch of the SDD. At the end of September 2008 the 
French banking industry froze its investments in relation to the SDD, and they received official 
support from the Portuguese Banking Community and the European Association of Co-
operative banks.  
The German Savings Banks Association (Deutscher Sparkassen und Giroverband or DSGV) is 
going even further. DSGV will investigate whether the development of the SDD should be 
suspended and has frozen the development of SEPA value-added services in the meantime. 
Already in July 2007, the DSGV refused a proposal of the Deutsche Bundesbank (German 
national bank) to agree on a fixed end-date for the national systems, i.e. migration from national 
credit transfers to SCT in 2010 and from national direct debit to SDD in 2014.
21  
In November 2008 several banks had not yet finalised their operational preparation for the mass 
processing of SCT transactions, and processing still requires manual intervention. According to 
surveys conducted in 2007 and 2008 by the ECB, the main source of information regarding 
                                                      
18 Gertrude Tumpel-Gugerell, speech at the first EU-US retail banking forum, Brussels, 15 February 
2005, p. 6f.  
19 European Commission, op. cit., p. 14ff. 
20 European Central Bank, “Eurosystem, Single Euro Payments Area”, Sixth progress report, November 
2008, p. 13. 
21 Kora Krause, Sparkassen sperren sich gegen neues EU-System, Handelsblatt, 11 July 2008. 8 | JÜRGEN BOTT 
SEPA remains the press, rather than banks. In the ECB’s view, bank information did not reflect 
a full appreciation of the impact of SEPA.
22 
Analysis of banks’ publicly available information on SEPA demonstrates that banks very often 
limit their SEPA information on the material to general political statements and explanations of 
what is written in the rule books for SCT and SDD and SCF. Banks do not emphasise the 
opportunity to innovate European payment services. In his keynote speech at the European 
Transaction Banking Conference – Euro Finance Week in Frankfurt, Charlie McCreevy, 
European Commissioner for Internal Market and Services, complained: “sadly too often I feel 
SEPA is only seen as an expensive, politically-hatched, cross-border payment system, rather 
than as a golden opportunity to modernise and integrate the whole payments market.”
23 
Conservatism among bank representatives might be better understood by recalling that the good 
functioning of payment services depends on a harmonised fit of several dimensions (technology, 
process design, legal and business models).  
The banking communities in Europe apply different business models to their payment services. 
And until the Payment Services Directive (PSD) is implemented, the legal fundaments of the 
payment business will be rather heterogeneous in the different European countries. Adaptations 
to technology and processes have to go hand in hand with changing the national legal bases and 
the national economic models of the payment business. All dimensions of the national payment 
business have to be converted and optimised almost simultaneously towards SEPA.  
3.  New standards benefit the network industry 
The SEPA project is in a critical phase. The Eurosystem has observed that motivation for the 
SEPA project has been fading away among market participants, and that the constructive spirit 
of the preparation phase has turned into a downbeat attitude.
24 Quick implementation of 
measures to strengthen the innovative power in the SEPA project and to re-stimulate the 
motivation is needed.  
Certainly the differences between the expectations and the deliverables seen at the end of 2008 
cannot be ignored. After six years of intensive work on the SEPA building site and roughly two 
years before SEPA originally should have been completed (in 2010), it must be concluded that 
the vision of theoretical benefits has not yet provided enough stimulus to change the industry. 
Too many market players in strategic positions did not consider this story convincing; they 
hardly see advantages in migrating from the old national standards to the new SEPA standards.  
Nevertheless, the ECB, ESCB and the Commission trust that the EPC has delivered sterling 
work. Indeed we have seen impressive results; keeping in mind the magnitude of the task 
creating the envisaged SEPA and the complexity of bringing competing organisations together 
to formulate the strategic fundaments of such an important business for the next decades. 
It is important to bear in mind that the payment industry is a network industry. In network 
industries, it can be burdensome and costly to introduce a new standard. The new SEPA 
standards have to replace all currently used national standards. In network industries a large 
installed base of network facilities has an inherent advantage over new technologies. New 
technologies – even with objective advantages – which are however not compatible with the 
                                                      
22 European Central Bank, op. cit., Sixth progress report, p. 13. 
23 Charlie McCreevy, “The Single Euro Payments Area (SEPA)”, European Transaction Banking 
Conference – Euro Finance Week, Frankfurt, 17 November 2008. 
24 European Central Bank, op. cit., Sixth progress report, p. 5. THE SINGLE EURO PAYMENTS AREA | 9 
installed base of network facilities have a competitive disadvantage entering the market.
25 
Therefore, it is necessary to have a look at the competitive aspects in the network industry first 
before analysing the costs and benefits of SEPA in more detail. 
3.1  Established alliances in the European payment industry  
The payment industry is a network industry similar to telephone or email services. An important 
characteristic of a network service is that the value a user gets from the service increases the 
more it is consumed. In network industries, the standards a service provider delivers will depend 
on the standards delivered by other service providers.
26 
3.1.1  Competition aspects of network industries 
In network industries there is the phenomenon that the value of a product or service depends on 
the number of users. The more people can be reached via email, the more value users of email 
services can draw from this service. The surplus from additional users who consume the service 
– not compensated for in the price – is commonly known as ‘positive demand-side network 
externalities’.  
If the owner of the network or an important service provider in the network can generate 
revenues from the network effects (for instance, by raising the prices), the effects are 
internalised. It has to be distinguished between direct network effects – which are an immediate 
result of other users adopting the same system – and indirect network effects – which are caused 
as a secondary result, for instance when complementary goods are less expensive or more 
widely available when more people use the same system.  
As an illustration, consider the following example of a direct network effect. The more people 
use a specific credit or debit card and the more merchants accept that card, the higher is the 
value of that card for the cardholders and the merchants. An example for an indirect network 
value is the following situation: If we had similar standards for POS terminals in Europe (that is, 
the interface used at point of sales, which are also known as Electronic Funds Transfer at Point 
of Sale, EFTPOS), the cost for providing terminal hardware and software might be less than in 
today’s fragmented environment.  
However, there are also negative network effects such as ‘provider complacency’. Reasons for 
this effect include: 
1)  The absence of viable competitors in a successful network. 
2)  ‘Resource limits’ which cause capacity shortages when adding new users or new services to 
the network. With the next user, the value of the network begins to decrease.  
As long as the netting of positive and negative network effects results in a surplus, network 
effects generate increasing returns. This builds up entrance barriers for new standards.  
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To successfully introduce a new standard, it is not sufficient to prove that the new standard has 
objective advantages in direct comparison with the old standard. The advantages of the new 
standard have to be so convincing that they exceed the network effects currently realisable with 
the old standard. It is at least necessary to convince the market participants that the new 
standard can produce network effects similar to those of the old standard.  
A SEPA migration process – driven by market forces – should be built on standards that allow 
the development of services that provide significant additional advantages. They have to be so 
impressive to overwhelm the positive net surplus of network effects of the currently used 
standard. These advantages could materialise in higher efficiency (reduced costs), reduced risk, 
increased revenues or more convenience. Consequently, bank customers will continue to invest 
in the old national standards unless it is obvious that the old standards will disappear within the 
time-period of an investment cycle. 
In a well-established network, dominant service providers can influence the market’s choice of 
new technologies by limiting the ability of competitors to introduce complementary ‘value-
added services’. There are for example self-regulated boards (staffed with employees from the 
dominant service providers) that licence the introduction of new POS terminals or chip-
technology on payments cards. Via licence-policies the dominant network providers can gain an 
advantage for their own complementary service – which may be inferior to those sponsored by 
competitors.
27  
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Box 1. Consequences of network effects 
Several consequences of network effects have to be kept in mind when analysing the motivation 
for migrating to new payment standards. 
•  The new standard has to overcome the direct network effects: the effects on the value of the 
products that link users with a network.  
Example: As long as there is no broad acceptance for a new payment card, consumers are 
less willing to grant the new card a slot in their wallet. As long as only a limited group of 
consumers has the new card available at point of sale, merchants are reluctant to sign new 
contracts or change internal payment processes allowing them to accept the new cards. 
•  The advantages of the new standard also have to compensate the indirect network effects 
generated by the availability of powerful complementary products that are built with some 
time-lag using the currently dominating standard.  
Example: Generally, software companies engaged in programming payment applications or 
interfaces to payment networks will base their developments on the most common 
standards. As long as it is not clear that new SEPA standards will replace the dominant 
national payment standards, complementary products will mainly be built on the ‘old’ 
national standards. Also innovations in complementary products might be based on the 
most common instead of the most modern standard. 
•  The additional advantages of the new standard have to be big enough to compensate for the 
costs of migration (switching costs). Migrating from national payment standards to new 
SEPA standards will require hardware and software investments as well as efforts to build up 
know-how on the side of the service providers and users. THE SINGLE EURO PAYMENTS AREA | 11 
The dominant stakeholders in the already established markets constitute ‘old’ alliances. They 
could have a tendency to maintain (to protect) existing networks as their stability helps to 
protect existing market distributions.  
3.1.2  Technique to switch a network market 
A common technique to switch a network market from old to new standards is low introductory 
pricing. In such a strategy, payment services based on the new SEPA standards would be 
offered for a very low price – for an interim period even below production costs – to build a 
large base of users quickly. However, such a strategy would cannibalise the revenue streams of 
the services based on the ‘old’ national standards. How far an established service provider 
would be damaged by such a cannibalisation effect depends on its market shares. The larger the 
market share, the bigger the cannibalisation effect.  
A low introductory pricing strategy might be more suitable for powerful newcomers than for 
service providers that already have dominant market shares in the payment markets and that 
would be strongly effected by cannibalisation. The formation of new alliances with members 
that are more positively than negatively affected by the introduction of the new SEPA standards 
might be necessary to tip the market.  
An alliance that created expectations that it would work hard to quickly build a large user base 
for the new standards would seem to be more convincing than an alliance of market players who 
are uncertain whether the new standard would cause them to lose or to gain market shares. The 
new alliances could be formed for example between banks – with a credible strategy to enter 
new markets – and non-banks – with a plausible interest to integrate payment services into their 
value chain. 
3.1.3  Payment services have ‘cross-selling’ potential for banks and non-banks 
Payment services are known to offer excellent ‘cross-selling’ opportunities for banks. Once 
having accessed the customer via payment services, banks can easily sell additional account-
related products (like credit lines for overdrafts). Payment services allow banks to generate 
additional revenues with interest or additional fees (for example, for payment card services). 
This allows some banks to ‘cross-subsidise’ the costs of payments services with the additional 
revenues earned from customers tied to a bank due to the payment services offered.  
From a procedural point of view, payment services could also be linked with the value chain of 
other industries, for example retailers. With the implementation of the Payment Services 
Directive (PSD), it will be easier for non-banks to enter the payments business. The ‘cross-
subsidisation’ potential of these potential market entrees could be even higher than the 
remaining ‘cross-subsidisation’ potential of banks already established in the national payment 
markets.  
3.2  Realisation of economies of scale and scope 
Management in operational banking very often focuses on cost-reduction strategies. European 
banks successfully realised economies of scale on a national level by consolidating their 
national market infrastructures over the past decades. They invested in rationalisation and 
automation of their national payment infrastructure and utilised economies of scale and scope 
on a national level. According to that experience, several managers initially assumed that they 
can easily apply their national strategies to SEPA and a similar evolution should apply to the 
euro area level.  12 | JÜRGEN BOTT 
3.2.1 Theoretical  expectations 
SEPA creates a new market. Operating on a larger scale will allow service providers to utilise 
cost savings in the purchasing process (bulk buying), at the managerial level (increasing 
specialisation), financially (better market conditions) and in marketing (spreading the cost of 
advertising over a greater range of output). Each of these factors reduces the average cost of 
production. This effect is commonly known as the realisation of ‘economies of scale’ and 
describes the decrease per unit cost as output increases.  
Theoretically the lowest unit costs can be utilised for bulk payments when the employed 
information technology is running on its maximum capacity. The more transactions a service 
provider can run on its machines the lower its unit costs will be. Established European-wide 
payment processors (for example, the company Equens) bundle payment transactions from 
different European countries on their machines. They can reduce their unit costs by utilising 
economies of scale at the European level.  
Small- and medium-sized banks and other payment service providers can benefit from 
economies-of-scale effects via ‘outsourcing’ strategies. Once harmonised payments standards 
are commonly implemented in SEPA, banks can follow a European-wide sourcing strategy. 
Conceptually similar to ‘economies of scale’ are the ‘economies of scope’. Whereas ‘economies 
of scale’ primarily refer to efficiencies associated with increased scale of a single product type, 
the latter occurs when there are cost savings arising from by-products in the production process. 
Economies of scope describe synergies between different products and can be realised when 
two or several products/services are produced jointly at lower unit costs than with separate 
production.  
 
 
Box 2. The French vs the German approach to liquidity collection 
French banks distinguish between the service for collecting liquidity on a regular basis in 
longer-lasting business relations (for example collecting payments for electricity companies 
from private households) and the collection of payments stemming from occasional purchases 
paid with a payment card at POS. The first service is processed as an ‘ordinary’ direct debit. For 
the second service, the collection of card transactions, the French banks design a separate 
service, the ‘card direct debit’. 
French banks have centralised the infrastructure for processing ‘card direct debit’. By bundling 
all the French ‘card direct debits’ on one platform, French banks can utilise economies of scale 
on a national level.  
German banks have not designed a specific ‘card direct debit’. They process in their current 
national design both types of services for liquidity collection with quite similar processes. They 
produce collections for payment card transactions together with all the other direct debits 
stemming from all kinds of business transactions. With this set-up German banks generate 
synergies between different types of services (economies of scope).  
However, German banks have not fully centralised the clearing and settlement of payment 
transactions. They run similar payment infrastructures in parallel in each banking sector. 
Thereby German banks are not completely utilising their potentials for economies of scale. THE SINGLE EURO PAYMENTS AREA | 13 
Banks expect that prices and their revenues for traditional payment services will decline 
between 3% and 10%.
28 In addition to the expected price reduction for payment services, SEPA 
could bring positive synergy effects to help enterprises and consumers to reduce the number of 
their payment processes. Currently enterprises have to set up separate payment processes in 
each of the SEPA countries in order to cope with the different national payment standards.  
Once payment standards are harmonised in SEPA, the companies and banks can apply the same 
standards all over SEPA and thereby reduce the number of different processes. If SEPA 
becomes a reality, it will enlarge the acceptance network for all payment instruments. Payment 
processes of shopping around in Europe – physically or virtually via the internet – will be more 
convenient, more secure and less expensive.  
Card payments provide good examples. Technology and processes at POS (point of sale) should 
be harmonised in SEPA. Card holders and merchants might then enjoy the benefits of a single 
entry point at POS. In SEPA, suppliers (of Terminals for Electronic Funds Transfer and Point of 
Sales) can produce on a larger scale and consequently merchants can buy hardware and software 
for supporting payment processes at POS for lower prices.  
Furthermore, SEPA can help to realise economies of scale and scope in innovation, in 
marketing and sales for payment services and in equipment used to support payment services. 
This will bring the advantages of a broader range of services earlier to bank customers, and will 
lower unit costs.  
Customisation for specific demands of different payment situations (for example, shopping on 
the internet or liquidity management along the supply chain of international companies) can be 
performed more efficiently with the modern technology recommended for the new SEPA 
standards than with today’s technology applied. Payment services can be combined more 
efficiently with additional functionalities (for example, loyalty card programmes or financing). 
New service features (such as card-to-card payments) can be provided faster and more 
effectively.  
3.2.2  Limitations on the synergy effects under SEPA 
However, analyses at the level of individual banks or national banking sectors showed that 
within the current procedural models, the (net) potential of realising economies of scope and 
scale are moderate. Harmonised rule books for SCT and direct debits SDD are only single steps 
on a long road which leads at its end to the realisation of the synergy potential of SEPA.  
Banks in Europe serve heterogeneous markets. They have adopted different business models 
and have designed their infrastructure accordingly. Therefore, European banks cannot just 
simply merge transactions on a European level in order to reduce unit costs. Rearrangements of 
process designs and business models – sometimes combined with disinvestments – are 
indispensable prerequisites before economies of scale and scope can be realised on a broader 
dimension.  
Before significant cost savings can be utilised, investments are required to adjust the currently 
used technical architecture. In addition to the costs of technical adjustments, new contracts (for 
example outsourcing contracts on a European level) are necessary in order to bundle payment 
transactions on a European level, on a higher scale.  
TowerGroup expects that European banks have to spend roughly €10 billion to introduce the 
new SEPA standards and PSE Consulting estimates that additional €6 billion are necessary to 
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make European banks compliant with the new European payments law, given in the Payment 
Services Directive (PSD).
29  
Higher aggregation of payment transactions requires consolidation, which will go along with the 
closing down of payment engines that only can process national standards. Extraordinary 
depreciation of the recent investments in these engines would be necessary. Just a few years 
ago, banks all over Europe invested in their payment engines in order to cope with the 
introduction of the euro and to get their IT compliant with the year 2000 (Y2K) requirements. 
Banks, which have to close down their nationally oriented payment systems, have to set off the 
potential economies of scale promised by SEPA against the unavoidable depreciation in 
relocating their payment transactions to a new payment platform that aggregates transactions on 
European scale.  
Sometimes economies of scope will have to be sacrificed before more economies of scale can 
be realised.  
For example, as described in Box 2, French banks process the liquidity transfer resulting from 
card transactions between issuing and acquiring bank via a specific ‘card direct debit 
infrastructure’. They utilise economies of scale on a national level as all French banks use that 
joint platform. By contrast, German banks process this liquidity transfer between issuing and 
acquiring banks as an ‘ordinary’ direct debit, together with the transactions stemming from all 
other direct debits and thereby realise economies of scope.  
One European strategy could be, that the German banks design a ‘card direct debit’ similar to 
the French ‘card direct debit’. French and German banks would process their card transactions 
jointly on a centralised platform. Following this strategy, the economies of scope that French 
banks first realised on a national level could then be utilised on a cross-border level.  
In this scenario the German banks would have to bear the costs of developing and introducing a 
‘new service line’: a ‘card direct debit’ (preferably similar to the French design). Then they 
would have to transfer their direct debit transactions from their current transaction platform to a 
specific ‘card direct debit’ machine, which is jointly used with the French banks. That would 
reduce the number of transactions on their current payment engines for all the other direct 
debits. Consequently the unit costs for the remaining direct debits would rise.  
In an alternative scenario, the French bankers could (theoretically) sacrifice their arguments for 
a specific ‘card direct debit’. If (legally, contractually and strategically) possible, they could 
process direct debits stemming from debit card transactions as ‘ordinary’ direct debits in the 
way German banks do. In this scenario, all direct debits – from different types of transactions – 
could be processed on a jointly used centralised ‘clearing engine’. Then French and German 
banks could (theoretically) utilise economies of scope and scale on a joint level.  
However, in this purely theoretical scenario, French bankers would have to depreciate their 
‘card direct debit’ infrastructure and abandon all the good arguments for a specific infrastructure 
for ‘card direct debits’.  
Synergies that can be utilised European-wide without disinvestments and within a few years 
(until end of 2010) are rather limited. They might not be attractive enough to generate the 
momentum to sufficiently change the nationally oriented European payments industry into a 
European-oriented industry.  
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Mrs. Tumpel-Gugerell, Member of the Executive Board of the ECB, speaking at the first EU-
US Retail Banking Forum in 2005, cited the views of international consulting companies that 
SEPA will not come about at zero costs for the payment industry. Besides the necessary 
investments to build the new SEPA infrastructure, it was feared that increased competition 
might cause an overall decrease in revenue of between €13 billion and €29 billion (minus 30-
60%, measured against a 2010 baseline scenario without the SEPA of the revenues of the 
traditional service offers).
30  
The costs of switching to the new standards are not limited to the banking sector (the service 
providers). Users too face immense migration costs as suggested in the following.  
[German insurance companies] calculate €3.5 billion only for getting the infrastructure 
ready for managing the mandates required by the SDD. Including costs for 
interruptions in the payments process during migration (for example loss of interest 
due to delayed payments in the interim period), managing irritated customers, follow-
up and back-up procedures, the German insurance industry calculates altogether €4.8 
billion for the introduction of the SDD (as proposed by the EPC in summer 2008).
31  
These are only the costs for one new SEPA product, in one European country and for one 
market segment. Simple projections of the total costs of all users in SEPA should give a good 
explanation why it is not an easy task to convince market participants to leave a (fairly) well-
functioning infrastructure and to invest in a European vision.  
3.3  From new standards to new business models 
Setting common technical standards is only part of the work. It is more problematic to transform 
the opportunities of new standards into new business models. Intensive reorganisation and 
disinvestments will be necessary to build new working environments in SEPA. The cost of 
depreciation and reconstruction – which can be calculated quite precisely in many cases – will 
reduce the imagined synergies that are eventually realised in SEPA. The net effect of theoretical 
cost-saving potential minus the cost of obvious reorganisation requirements is the decision-
making basis for SEPA.  
3.3.1  International banks probably cannot tip the national markets 
The payments industry is a network industry, as stated above. Key strategic decisions have to be 
made almost simultaneously in organisations that are in competition with each other, follow 
different strategies and have different abilities to innovate or prepare for an industry change. 
Only if consensus on a new business model can be reached – among stakeholders who represent 
significant market shares and hold key positions in the industry– will it be possible to generate 
the synergies promised by SEPA.  
As already described, the cross-border business within SEPA represents only a small share of 
the payments market. The dominant national standards, which all would have to be replaced by 
the new SEPA standards, are built around national market requirements.  
International banks (for example, Deutsche Bank) have separate organisational units in several 
European countries that run their own national payments engines. They maintain different 
payment infrastructures in Europe. Modifications in response to new compliance requirements 
(for example, money laundering or new requirements of the PSD) create several similar projects 
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in parallel (for each of the IT systems designed for the specific national requirements). These 
international banks have rather easily identifiable advantages of a new common SEPA standard. 
They could centralise major parts of their maintenance work and thereby reduce their respective 
costs.  
We find a quite different situation for banks running payment infrastructure in only one 
European country. They do not have the costs of similar simultaneous IT projects in several 
European countries. From this group of banks the obvious advantages – regarding IT 
maintenance costs – of a common SEPA standard are (at first glance) limited to their rather 
small portion of cross-border transactions within SEPA.  
Let us consider for example the German market: Deutsche Bank’s market share in the domestic 
retail payment business is less than 10%, whereas the mainly domestic-oriented banks (saving 
banks and cooperative banks) hold roughly 2/3 of the national market, which dominates the 
German payments business. Accordingly, the international banks, which might have the most 
obvious stimulus resulting from synergies on the cost side, are by no means in the position to tip 
the domestic market, i.e. to be a standard-setter. Banking groups, which are strong in the 
national markets in Europe, have less obvious advantages – with respect to cost-reducing 
synergies.  
3.3.2  Dominant banks and their strong national focus 
Usually the formation of a strong and capable group of market participants (an alliance) is 
necessary in order to switch the markets from old to new standards (i.e. to tip the market). 
Members of the alliance necessary for tipping the European payments markets towards the new 
SEPA standards have to identify the economic advantages SEPA might bring to their specific 
business model. They have to have a common understanding of how to share and distribute the 
overall impressive benefits of SEPA. Finally, they need a convincing story to explain their 
strategy of how to tip the market to the market participants and to the regulators. Otherwise, 
they will not get sufficient support from these stakeholders.  
Currently the alliances necessary to develop and maintain the rules and regulations (including 
the technical and operational standards) of the payments business are formed in each country 
around the ‘dominating’ part of the payments business, which is in general domestic. The 
members of the EPC (representatives of European banks and banking associations of Europe) 
are almost identical with the people who have to manage and maintain the current national 
infrastructure.  
Some of the stakeholders in the European banking industry do not appreciate the impressive 
economic benefits described by the Commission. They question the economic benefits expected 
and criticise the project for being launched without having first been closely analysed for the 
strong interaction between technical, legal, and economical issues. They argue that moving too 
fast without having solved discrepancies among countries will create huge distortions in the 
payments market, to the detriment of end users.  
Economic uncertainties would hold back the momentum needed to replace domestic instruments 
by European ones. Without sustainable business cases for the new standards, banks and users 
will be unable to commit the requisite technical and commercial investments.
32 
Being intensively engaged in the national infrastructure, it might be difficult to see, how 
innovations in the European payments industry could significantly contribute to make the EU 
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the most competitive and dynamic knowledge-driven economy. From the perspective of some 
payment managers in charge, bank customers already receive satisfying payment services. 
“European consumers are broadly content with their domestic payment instruments at the 
moment.”
33 In their opinion, only marginal improvements are necessary to make customers 
completely satisfied. They believe that with the offers already in the market, nothing of real 
importance is missing. They reject the argument that improved payment services could provide 
significant additional advantages to the customers, which would make the customers willing to 
pay for ‘value added service’ delivered on the road to SEPA. The developments they consider to 
be valuable can be provided almost regardless of SEPA.  
According to their business understanding, the expectations attached to SEPA should be 
lowered significantly. In their minds, bank contributions to SEPA should be limited to ensure a 
smooth technical interoperability between the well functioning national payment systems. In 
this model of thinking, the best SEPA strategy is to achieve technical interoperability between 
the domestic systems with the lowest possible investments. 
4.  Commitment to the vision of SEPA 
A self-regulated process that is driven by market forces needs alliances of people who are 
strongly committed to the vision of SEPA and are motivated to change the industry instead of 
preserving it. The members of the alliances needed for SEPA must clearly see that the future of 
SEPA is brighter than the present. Any alliance this is able to fulfil the promise of SEPA and 
significantly contribute to the Lisbon Agenda will have to be committed to innovation and the 
entrepreneurial spirit. Bankers with a clear SEPA mindset will have to consider the following 
questions: 
•  How long can they wait for SEPA to be realised (for how long can their banks carry 
redundant costs)? 
•  Can they find sufficient arguments to convince the more nationally oriented  bankers, which 
often dominate the national markets, that SEPA brings a strong positive net effect also for 
them? 
•  Or must they look for alternative partners (new alliances) that are strong enough to tip the 
national markets? 
European banks will have to go through a sequence of steps, before they are ready to realise 
economies of scale and scope in SEPA. Preliminary work has to be done on at least three layers 
both industry wide and with the individual organisations: i) operational strategy, ii) technical 
and procedural readiness and iii) organisational behaviour.  
4.1 Operational  strategy 
Drawing significant benefits out of SEPA has to be recognised on the individual stakeholder’s 
level as a realistic option. The dimension of the realistic benefits has to be big enough to justify 
the disinvestments and costs for rebuilding operational infrastructure.  
The opportunities SEPA can offer to the different stakeholders have to rank very high in 
comparison to alternative business opportunities. During the last few years, bank managers 
devoted more of their innovative power to investment banking than to payment services. 
Keeping in mind the financial crisis, the trade-off between potential synergies, and the obvious 
depreciations and cost for amendments are certainly an obstacle in the way towards SEPA. In 
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the current situation most banks have only limited financial resources left to invest in payment 
services. Additionally, they have limited power for investments with a high degree of 
uncertainty.  
To identify and utilise the potential of SEPA, a new business understanding is necessary. A 
strategy of “doing more and better of the same” is not sufficient. Operational bankers will have 
to rethink – and to innovate – their traditional business models, which were nationally oriented. 
They will have to accept that traditional sources of revenues will dry up.  
Motivation for the innovations – requested by the Lisbon Agenda – will have to come from 
additional revenues, demonstrated in convincing new business models. Additional revenues can 
stem from new service offers suitable to fulfil customer needs not completely satisfied with 
current offers. If banks are not ready to provide the needed value-added service, others will do 
so.  
4.1.1  Additional sources of revenues for service providers 
The more regionally oriented – and often smaller – banks hardly see how SEPA could help 
them to improve their competitiveness. Looking into other industries, however, we can see there 
are several smaller and medium-sized enterprises that are very successful in international 
competition. They sometimes outperform their bigger competitors. For example, in the 
automotive industry, Porsche and BMW belong to the smaller producers, but they are at the 
same time the most profitable ones. There are several smaller banks in Europe with a return on 
equity exceeding those of bigger banks. There are at least two good reasons for this 
phenomenon: i) product differentiation and ii) flexibility.  
If customers’ preferences are highly differentiated, there will be opportunities to gain higher 
prices for products or services fulfilling specific customer needs. Under specific market 
conditions, prices can be set so high that they over-compensate higher unit costs due to 
diseconomies of scale.  
Those who believe that customers are already fully satisfied with banks’ current offers in 
payment services should consider that buying and payment behaviour of consumers has 
changed considerably in recent years. There are examples that strongly indicate that bank 
customers are not fully satisfied with the ‘classical’ means of payment. PayPal was successful 
because ‘classical’ means of payment are inadequate for the payment requirements in the 
internet auctions of eBay.  
In a position paper entitled “Creating a Pan-European Payments Area (SEPA)” published in 
January 2006,
34 the Federation of German Industries stated: “The present-day processing of 
payments… does not meet the expectations of non-banks concerning a pan-European, STP-
compliant and efficient payment system…”  Over four pages they list the shortcomings of 
today’s offers for international payment services, including the following: 
•  Enterprises request real ‘end-to-end integration’ of their financial processes. They have 
solved most of their intra-company communications and interoperability problems. Now 
they are focusing on external communications and processes with their suppliers, including 
financial service suppliers.  
•  Corporate treasurers are looking for overall efficiency of all financial transactions and not 
just an interface for sending credit transfers or direct debits and receiving account 
statements electronically.  
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•  Small and large organisations use standardised web-based technology that allows low-cost, 
secure, real-time information exchange. They request flexible and modular inter-operable 
solutions with a high degree of automation (for instance, single input of data) which can be 
used globally.  
Some of the companies help themselves: BASF built its own ‘payment factory’ and EADS 
(European Aeronautic Defence and Space Company) uses a small SWIFT Service Bureau to run 
several Member Administered Close User Group (MA-CUG) arrangements with different 
banks. This arrangement allows EADS to act almost like a bank in its own ‘correspondent 
banking network’. The costs for building and managing this multi-MA-CUG network with 
intensive use of SWIFT services are almost marginal in comparison to the advantages EADS 
gains in treasury management.  
Before EADS made the decision to build its own network, EADS managers unsuccessfully 
requested service improvements from several European and non-European banks. Similarly, 
BASF first tried to optimise its payment processes with the help of banks. Finally, they decided 
for a ‘self-help approach’.  
There are also calls from SMEs, retailers and their respective associations requesting improved 
payment services at the national and international level. The key message is: There are 
unsatisfied customer needs. Not all of them can be rejected on grounds of network externalities. 
Service providers do have chances to differentiate (more) via service offers and to ‘earn extra 
money’ with ‘value-added services’. 
In comparison to the ‘old’ payment standards, the new payment services built on XML 
standards will make it easier to efficiently combine ‘sub-processes’ with customised solutions 
for specific market segments. Banks can react more flexibly with regard to customer requests 
and have more freedom to differentiate via service offers. XML opens up more possibilities to 
compete on service levels.  
Differentiation on functionality and quality provides banks with opportunities to react to the 
expected price erosion for ‘classical’ payment services with higher-priced ‘customised services’ 
or additional revenues for ‘value-added services’ designed for certain groups of customers 
willing to pay for the extra service.  
4.1.2  The means of payments impact on the purchasing process 
The definition of a product or service includes a large number of variables: shape, packaging, 
brand, guarantee and financial elements. Means of payment is one of the financial variables that 
define a product. Changes in payment habits, new instruments and new communication 
channels open a number of alternative payment systems that impact the purchasing process.  
New payment services can also help bank customers (such as retailers or online shops) to 
increase their turnover. Credit cards foster spontaneous purchases. Retailers accepting credit 
cards build on such effects. Research from PayPal shows that “adequate means of payment” can 
help online shops (e-commerce) to increase sales by 5 to 20%.
35  
Convenience can also be a source of additional revenue. For instance, the effort needed to fill 
out a form or to enter static data can make a difference. In PayPal, customers have to enter 
account or card information only once. They can use this data for all their internet transactions 
when paying with PayPal. According to a study from Jupiter Research (published 5 January 
2006), adults in the United States who use credit cards online consider the convenience function 
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to enter card data only once to be the most important criterion when deciding which payment 
medium to use. This form of convenience was ranked higher than reward programmes or online 
security.
36  
With ‘Base plus Google payments’, anyone can sell goods and services on the Internet. 
Shoppers can buy without ever leaving Google’s site. With its new payment services Google 
can offer merchants a bundle of services that includes both paid search and transaction 
processing. Merchants only pay when a sale is completed. ‘Pay for purchase’ could be a more 
appealing model for merchants than Google’s current approach ‘pay per click’.
37 
The Payment Services Directive (PSD) will make it easier for non-banks to enter deeper into the 
payments value chain. The example of Google demonstrates that payment services have cross-
selling potential not only for banks. They can be implemented into the business models of non-
banks and will help non-banks to redesign their financial processes – which might make them 
more independent from banking services.  
Payment services implemented in the business model of non-banks could lead to new business 
cases for payment services, which could be more applicable than the current business cases for 
payment services in the traditional business models of banks.  
Non-bank service providers could become one of the driving forces of the SEPA process. They 
are not represented extensively in the EPC. If they drive the SEPA process, it is quite likely that 
they will not apply the measures of the EPC. Perhaps they will even not apply the standards 
published by the European banks and their associations.  
Alternatively, the non-bank service providers could ally with banks to complement their 
payment operations with financing and depository products of European and non-European 
banks.  
4.2  Technical and procedural readiness for SEPA 
Payment processes are strongly interwoven with other financial processes of banks, the 
processes of technical service providers (for example, computer centres or network service 
providers) and the financial processes of enterprises (such as direct debit services or cash 
management applications). Today, synergies are generated within an individual banking 
organisation or within a specific banking group (saving banks, cooperative banks or private 
banks) or within a financial market. In order to generate synergies, extensive parts of the 
payment value chain are brought into one ‘business unit’ to become nearly ‘monolithic blocks’.  
Information technology architecture is optimised for the current internal requirements of a bank, 
a banking group or a national financial market. It is procedurally and even more politically 
complex to break off such well-functioning local optimisation for the sake of the vision of an 
even better optimisation in a still somewhat vague SEPA. Disputed standards, rules and 
regulations for SEPA make it difficult to identify these parts of the payment process that are 
suitable for the realisation of economies of scope in European outsourcing strategies.  
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4.2.1  Modularity of payment sub-processes  
Bank payment processes will need to be re-designed. New technology can help to design 
European payments processes so that they can be split up into smaller independent sub-
processes. Most of the sub-processes will be common to the different market needs in SEPA 
and common to the different payment instruments used. Small sub-processes can more easily be 
re-arranged between different service providers in Europe than today’s ‘monolithic’ processes.  
Modular process design with small sub-processes will enable a new dimension of sourcing 
opportunities. Harry Leinonen from the Bank of Finland combines these growing opportunities 
for outsourcing with the sustained decline in costs for information technology hardware and 
software in recent years and concludes that the cost of payments could become marginal and 
comparable to sending emails.
38 
Following his reasoning, we would have to conclude that the key success factor for realising 
significant cost savings is innovation in process design. Payment processes will have to be 
progressively divided into standardised sub-processes, which can be supported by common 
programme libraries and perhaps even freeware solutions.
39 In comparison, bundling the 
European payments transaction into one of the payment engines following traditional process 
design might bring only limited advantages.  
In several European countries there are standards and procedures in place, which were designed 
decades ago. In comparison to these traditional standards, the technology proposed by the EPC 
for SEPA (XML; Extensible Markup Language) allows a more effective design of new means 
of payments or an easier customisation of offers for specific needs of certain market segments.  
4.2.2  Extended value chains with XML technology  
In comparison with the currently applied technology, the telecommunications standard XML – 
which is promoted by the EPC – makes it easier to enlarge the current service offers of banks. 
XML might help banks to enlarge the banks’ value chain. Electronic invoicing is one example 
leading the thinking in this direction. In the current business understanding of payment services 
offered by banks, bank payments services start with receiving credit transfers or direct debit 
orders. In this understanding the service ends with sending account statements and information 
on received or executed payment transactions to the customer.  
From the perspective of the customer, the payments value chain is longer. A customer has to 
perform several tasks to produce credit transfers or direct debits before he can send payment 
instructions to his bank. When the customer receives the account statements from his bank, 
reconciliation and accounting tasks are necessary before the payment process is complete. An 
enlarged payment service understanding of banks could start with a purchasing order of the 
customer and could end with booking entries in the financial accounting system of the customer.  
Electronic invoicing networks allow sending invoices and receiving payments electronically in a 
standardised way by all participants in a commercial supply chain. All process steps in the value 
chain between sending an invoice and making the account entries for the received payments 
follow standards. In electronic invoicing networks, banks – so far limited to the traditional 
business understanding – could offer new services along the supply chain in an efficient way 
(such as reconciliation services).  
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Innovations such as substituting manual paper-based processes with e-invoicing would be 
fostered in particular in the sector of small- and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs). Linking 
these organisations electronically in their supply chains would contribute to efficiency 
improvements at the individual and at the overall level.  
E-invoicing by the Danish government saves an estimated €100 to €134 million per year in 
public sector procurement. The Finnish Federation of Industry has estimated that the potential 
for cost savings of e-invoicing in the business-to-business area is €2.8 billion per annum.
40 The 
European Association of Corporate Treasurers has indicated in its Corporate Action on 
Standards project that e-invoicing has a savings potential of more than €243 billion a year in 
business-to-business across Europe.
41  
In addition to the gained process efficiency, e-invoicing, provided by a trusted third party 
(bank), might reduce the operational risk of the SME, which otherwise could not afford to apply 
similar process quality. SMEs could benefit from economies of scale and scope by outsourcing 
their internal services to the banks. 
Being enrolled electronically in the standardised exchange of financial data along the whole 
supply chain might help financial institutions to improve their financing processes. As a 
consequence, financing can be provided more effectively and therefore more cost-efficiently for 
the enterprises. Payment infrastructure could be built up to an ‘electronic sales channel’ for 
financing and cash-management products.  
4.3 Organisational  behaviour 
The vision of SEPA and the commitment to achieve its benefits has to be anchored in the mind 
of the managers driving the process. Members of the teams setting and implementing the SEPA 
standards have to recognise the benefits that SEPA will bring for their employers’ strategy and 
that SEPA will contribute to their own careers.  
It also has to be recognised that the idea of SEPA might meet with resistance. Reaping 
economies of scale in an industry with limited growth often requires mergers or the ousting of 
market players from their position. In general, people rarely seek organisational changes for 
they imply discontinuity and destruction of familiar arrangements and relationships. Differences 
in technology and process design are helpful in protecting markets and initial preliminary 
consideration helps to secure jobs. 
The resistance is even stronger when the members of the organisation do not understand the 
reasoning behind the change or why the changes will bring improvements. Personal values 
ultimately determine which changes are welcomed, promoted and successful, and which will 
fail. Each (important) stakeholder in the payments process needs a purpose, a story to believe in 
why SEPA will improve the current situation.  
4.4  New alliances are necessary to create SEPA 
No service provider in Europe currently holds a strong enough position to quickly build a broad 
user base for new standards. Alliances are necessary to tip the European payments markets 
towards the new SEPA standards.  
The (old) alliances that developed and maintained the standards currently applied are formed in 
each country around the ‘dominant’ part of the payments business, which is in general domestic. 
Organisations – i.e. the people working for those organisations – that fear that SEPA might 
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overall bring more negative than positive effects might be inclined to drive the process of 
creating SEPA very cautiously. 
The members of the new alliances have to identify the economic advantages SEPA might bring 
to their specific business models. They have to have a common understanding of how to share 
and distribute the overall impressive benefits of SEPA.  
Gaining broad support for SEPA requires perseverance and patience. Payment experts have to 
be trained to think in European terms. Their support is necessary to develop and to apply new 
SEPA standards, qualified to design new business models for SEPA.  
The new business models have to demonstrate how the own organisation can participate in the 
benefits proclaimed for SEPA. The SEPA business models have to be more profitable than the 
current domestic ones. The SEPA strategies have to be convincing enough to justify the 
investments to migrate to the new standards.  
It will not be sufficient if banks limit their contribution to the process of creating SEPA to 
simply substituting existing payment standards with new standards without changing the 
underlying business models. Participation in the exploration of the impressive benefits of SEPA 
requires a new understanding of the payments business in SEPA. 
The alliances capable of tipping the market should consist of more than just bankers and bank 
associations. The economic interests of enterprises, consumers, public administrations and 
banks have to stimulate the development of and the migration to new payment standards. The 
European Commission otherwise, the cooperative process could lead to solutions that are sub-
optimal from a wider economy perspective.
42  
An alliance of important market players is necessary. The members of that alliance have to have 
an interest in changing the current distribution of the market shares significantly and they have 
to agree on a strategy of differentiation. Stakeholders, already involved in the payments value 
chain, might broaden their contributions to the overall payment process and thereby change the 
traditional business models. They have to deliver advantages to the payment service customers, 
which the customers do not receive with the current business design.  
The main success factors of the new alliances are: 
Support along the value chain. It is necessary for the alliance to have support along the value 
chain. Banks, which intend to tip the market, have to ally with important players of different 
business sectors and geographical regions. They need support from major customers 
(merchants, enterprises, public organisations) and suppliers (such as network service providers, 
clearing organisations and schemes). 
Expectation management. Customers, suppliers and producers of complementary products 
have to be convinced that the new alliances will succeed. Besides creating and communicating 
the vision, (new) organisations have to be empowered to act upon that vision. Among other 
routes, this can be reached by establishing ‘innovative companies’ (for example as payment 
institutes or clearing houses with the ability to extend their service offers). The empowered 
companies have to create ‘short-term wins’, such as gaining international partners for clearing 
services.  
Market lead. Improvements have to be consolidated to produce further change. Cooperation 
between innovative banks and key customers should be established with a clear commitment to 
service differentiation. New ways of customer access – bypassing traditional sales challenges 
which prove to be resistant to the SEPA idea – have to be established. The customer base of the 
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cooperating partners and the way the new payments business design attracts additional business 
should provide confidence for success at an early stage. For example, international retailers 
could ally with rebate card organisation and banks to issue payment cards – perhaps in co-
branding with an international payment cards scheme – which combine rebate services and 
payment functionalities on a SEPA-wide scale.  
Organisations participating in these forms of cooperation have to be ready for short innovation 
cycles. A single innovative payment service could be diffused very quickly. To make a 
difference, it is important to demonstrate the willingness and ability for a continuous lead. Once 
the competition on innovation is started, new payment services – which provide valuable 
advantages to the customers in their target segments – have to be delivered in short intervals. 
The new approach to running the payments business in SEPA has to be institutionalised. 
Success sharing. Intelligent solutions are necessary to distribute the generated value among the 
partners in the alliance. In the old alliances, multilateral interchange fees (MIF) and multilateral 
balanced payments (MBP) ensured revenue distribution between issuing banks and acquiring 
banks. Decisions of DG Competition will limit future use of such arrangements. Most of these 
arrangements will have to be substituted by new business and pricing models that are not in 
violation of EC Treaty rules on restrictive business practices.  
Smart profit-sharing policies are especially required for securing influence over the providers of 
complementary products (for example, PoS terminals or software, enterprise resource planning 
systems). 
Compatibility with existing services and standards. An interface with the existing domestic 
standards should also be provided. It would be a disruptive element in a market-driven process, 
if competing companies commonly set an end-date for serving the old standard. However, that 
might be another necessary intervention of European regulators to spur on the creation of the 
SEPA. 
5. Conclusions 
The payment industry is a network industry. None of the current European service providers has 
the power to tip the market on its own. It will be necessary for them to form new alliances 
among members who are strongly convinced that SEPA will improve significantly their own 
economics. The ‘old’ alliances, which build and maintain the actual payment infrastructure, are 
not sufficiently motivated to create SEPA in a self-regulated process purely driven by market 
forces.  
The creation of SEPA will first lead to higher costs to set up new payment infrastructures and to 
run old and new infrastructures in parallel. During the initial phase of running parallel 
infrastructure, SEPA’s potential on the revenue side is vulnerable to the effects of 
cannibalisation. For the foreseeable future, the net effects between the potential cost savings – 
mainly due to realisation of economies of scope and scale – and the costs of closing down 
existing national infrastructure will not be fully convincing to all important stakeholders of the 
European payment industry.  
SEPA’s cost savings and revenue potential are unevenly distributed among European banks. 
Banks with an international operational infrastructure identify positive synergies more easily 
than banks with a purely domestic strategy and infrastructure. The ability to establish new 
strategies to explore additional sources of revenue in the payments business depends on the 
individual bank’s innovative strength in the field of transaction business. Operational and 
strategic readiness for e-business (e-SEPA), a prerequisite to utilise the cost savings and 
revenue potential for example of e-invoicing, is not yet recognised among all European bankers.  THE SINGLE EURO PAYMENTS AREA | 25 
There are differences between banks’ deliverables to realise SEPA and the expectations of 
‘innovative’ service, requested in the speeches of the European Commission and ECB officials. 
More effort is needed to bring service improvements significantly above the lowest denominator 
of existing national service levels. 
As explained by examples, certain market segments in Europe’s payments business are not fully 
satisfied with current service offers. Some of these customers might align themselves with 
banks, which are fully committed to the potential and the expected innovations of SEPA. These 
new alliances of ‘innovative’ banks and non-banking institutions will look for payment products 
that will serve their needs better than the current ones. 
Until the new alliances are formed, the Commission and the ECB will have to continue to 
promote the SEPA process. Regulations are necessary to facilitate the launch of SEPA products 
and to ensure European-wide reachability with the new SEPA standards. It will even be 
necessary to regulate the existing business models (for example by providing clear guidance 
with respect to ‘multilateral interchange fees’) to help the banking industry to come forward 
with business models suitable for SEPA.  26 | 
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